Category: Cold War

Vietnam War history book – “The Psychological War for Vietnam” (University Press of Kansas, 2018) – Merv Roberts interview

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Dr. Merv Roberts has worked on psychological operations in Afghanistan. His work there inspired him to write a history of psychological operations in the Vietnam War and I interviewed him about this book “The Psychological War for Vietnam, 1960-1968.”

2:07- Dr. Roberts decided on studying Information Operations in Vietnam after he returned from a deployment to Afghanistan. No one had done an over arching study of Psychological Operations in the Vietnam War.

3:38 – The book is on joint operations and looked at both North and South Vietnam. He used the Foreign Broadcast Information Service collections.

5:25 – The North Vietnam program was modeled on the Soviet program. It’s about agitation and propaganda. The American system evolved over the course of the war. It came from the American advertising culture that used subjective truth.

8:38 – North Vietnamese leadership was divided over whether to focus on the North or to spread the revolution to the South. The US started trying to divide these factions in 1967 but then [we] the US ends psy war against the North after the Tet Offensive.

12:14 – The North became ineffective at waging psychological warfare against the South but was very effective in it’s worldwide campaign to get countries against the war.

17:11 – Dr. Roberts compares psychological operations and civil affairs activities. In Vietnam civil affairs fell under psychological operations.

21:31 – Edward Landsdale was good at psychological operations in the region.

23:55 – The North Vietnamese used some anti-war activists to spread their message.

27:03 – FBIS is a largely untapped resource for information on the Cold War and events during this period. He also wants to use Geographic Information Systems in conjunction with FBIS information. He also used the Hamlet level evaluations which he admits many people consider a subjective assessment of villages. There were also terrorist activity reports with geographic data attached. The Friendly Forces file provides data on where friendly forces were during the war.

34:04 – Most Psy Ops guys aren’t trained very well during Vietnam.

35:35 – Going through all the captured documents was fascinating for Dr. Roberts. Much of them haven’t been looked at more than once since capture.

37:03 – There are indications the program was effective in 1968.

39:08 – The Vietnamese go to Texas Tech when they want to research the Vietnam War because of how many documents Tech has from the war. FBIS is harder to get a hold of.

42:25 – There are very few books looking at psychological operations across various wars so this book will help fill that gap.

47:34 – There were problems between various US government organizations on how to do psy op in Vietnam. The State Department had the primacy on what messaging would be done in Vietnam.

 

For more “Military History Inside Out” please follow me on Facebook at warscholar, on twitter at Warscholar, on youtube at warscholar1945 and on Instagram @crisalvarezswarscholar

 

Guests: Merv Roberts

Host: Cris Alvarez

Tags: vietnam war, psychological operations, north vietnam, tet offensive, hamlet program

Modern warfare book – “The Decline of European Naval Forces” (Naval Institute Press, 2018) – Jeremy Stöhs interview

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Jeremy Stohs The decline of European Naval Forces

Check out the book here https://amzn.to/3ceVMji

Modern warfare book – “The Decline of European Naval Forces” (Naval Institute Press, 2018) – Jeremy Stöhs interview

Interview Timeline

Jeremy Stöhs is an Austrian-American defense analyst at the Institute for Security Policy at Kiel University and its adjunct Center for Maritime Security & Strategy. I interviewed him about his new book “The Decline of European Naval Forces.”

1:28 – Jeremy talks about where his interest in history started. His parents were his first inspiration. He did mandatory military service in Austria and then joined the police for a short time. Then he left the police and studied history. He joined a think tank about intelligence matters, historic and contemporary security matters.

3:52 – He studies the period of the 80s to the end of the Cold War. Much information is classified so he needs to use other open sources.

6:50 – There is no comprehensive overview of European navies since the end of the Cold War.

9:07 – Some nations at the end of the Cold War prudently saw the end of the Soviet Union coming. But many did not. Most were focused on waging a conventional or nuclear war against a peer adversary. They were focused on controlling sea lines of communication. The US naval strategy was to put pressure on the Soviet flanks and the NATO countries followed the US lead. Sea control and sea denial and controlling SLOCs.

13:22 – Jeremy includes 11 European nations in his study. Denmark and Germany quickly shifted to out of area deployments. Britain switched from anti-submarine warfare to focusing on out of area deployments.

15:23 – Maritime traffic increased year by year after the end of the Cold War. A lot of maritime traffic has moved to Asia. Small conflicts popped up after the Cold War and European navies started deploying to areas they hadn’t been before. The Mediterranean, red Sea and the Horn of Africa. But many focused on territorial defense.

17:52 – Greece and Turkey began building similar naval forces to counter each other.

18:52 – Jeremy’s book is budgetary and platform specific. He looks at the physical make up of the navies. He also looks at men and material. Many have realized they’ve under-invested. But too many focus on the big Navy idea that the US has developed.

23:52 – Many of these navies have experienced a steep decline in their navies. However individual ships are of much higher quality than individual ships from 25 years ago. Current ships have much more battlespace awareness and are more proficient at war and other tasks.

25:37 – Through the 1990s, high intensity conflict skills atrophied, whereas low intensity conflict capabilities grew. European navies are much better at low intensity than they were 30 years ago.

27:24 – He looked at official grand strategy, military strategy, naval strategy and then naval maritime doctrine open source documents. He also used official statements about the navies. There is also a lot of secondary sources for military technology.

30:08 – The maritime research community is small and very helpful among its members. A lot of governments and citizens don’t understand the importance of maritime issues so maritime researchers feel the need to work together.

35:04 – Europeans are no longer as connected to the oceans as they used to be. But people are beginning to realize the importance of the navy again. They have more than a military role. Navies also have a constabulary role. The 2007 debt crisis hurt a lot of these navies.

39:22 – European navies are highly professional. They can really work well together especially among NATO countries.

42:26 – However Jeremy was surprised by how steep the decline was in the navies. Navy capabilities take decades to develop but the politicians haven’t thought in this time frame. Governments didn’t have the money for navies. The Dutch navy for example was slashed. Germany has decided to become more expeditionary but they can’t build the platforms they need for this.

46:52 – Jeremy will continue to focus on European naval forces. His book will become dated as soon as it is published. He wants to find out what the internal conversations were in these countries. He wants to speak with more decision makers. Some sources up to 1996 and 1998 are being declassified.

50:33 – There’s a huge focus on the US and Chinese navies but no one is studying European navies as a whole. Even landlocked countries can help with maritime security. He hopes the book will raise eyebrows in the US. He also wants to highlight his think tank in Kiel.

53:25 – It’s becoming increasingly difficult for young scholars to get books published. Jeremy feels very fortunate that the naval Institute would publish his book.

54:44 – The Institute for Security Policy at Kiel University can be found www.kielseapowerseries.com. They are in twitter as seapowerseries. They have a big conference every June.

Links

https://amzn.to/3ceVMji

https://www.kielseapowerseries.com/en/

https://www.ispk.uni-kiel.de/de/mission-statement

Twitter: @SeapowerSeries

Contact Information

For more “Military History Inside Out” please follow me on Facebook at warscholar, on twitter at Warscholar, on youtube at warscholar1945 and on Instagram @crisalvarezswarscholar

Guests: Jeremy Stöhs (Jeremy Stohs)

Host: Cris Alvarez

Tags: europe, navy, sea power, netherlands, greece, turkey, UK, denmark, russia, united states, maritime, cold war, 21st century

Check out the book here https://amzn.to/3ceVMji

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Cold War history – Always At War – Author Dr. Mel Deaile interview

Dr. Mel Deaile attended the US Air Force Academy. He then became a bomber pilot and earned his PhD with the Air Force. He know teaches nuclear deterrence related subjects for the Air Force. He’s written a number of pieces and this is his latest book, Always at War about the Strategic Air Command.

1:30 – Dr. Deaile talks about his early writing. He’s spent 26 years in the Air Force and is retired. During this time he did a master’s thesis on nuclear weapons. Then the Air Force had him get a PhD in the field.

3:30 – In 1984 he reported to the Air Force Academy. He graduated from pilot training in 1989 and then given a B-52. Later he joined Strategic Air Command.

4:36 – The book was focused on explaining what was unique about the SAC’s organizational structure. Curtis LeMay was the originator of much of what made SAC different. He took it over in October 1948 and stayed for almost 9 years. His experience came from being a bomber pilot in WWII. His charge was to create and run strategic level force of bombers carrying nuclear bombs. He decided to create a force that was always ready for war.

8:23 – Competition among his personnel was one way he kept them sharp. LeMay kept a totem pole that ranked all his wing commanders. He also used bomb competitions.

9:46 – Bomber generals tended to be people who led the Air Force. The path to higher level command went through SAC. However, LeMay was opposed to general training and preferred on the job flight training.

11:45 – SAC was stood up in 1946 to do independent strategic bombing. They were to be kept out of the hands of theater commanders. Twentieth Air Force was the first and was converted to SAC.

13:53 – The Soviet Union affected how SAC did its job. They didn’t send their best assets to the Korean War so that the Russians wouldn’t learn what SAC’s best assets were like. They also worried about a US fifth column that would sabotage US national assets, so LeMay created red cells to test base security.

16:40 – When the Soviet Union put up Sputnik, SAC had its first alert under General Thomas Power three days before Sputnik went up. Truman created the Atomic Energy Commission to hold atomic materials for nuclear weapons. Eisenhower transferred custody of the weapons back to the military.

19:16 – Several things happened in 1962 that affected SAC. The Cuban Missile Crisis was one. SAC reached its highest personnel level in 1962. It was a huge part of the Air Force. It’s also the last year that a bomber was built for the US for many years afterwards. Lastly, the US turned to more flexible responses in war.

22:32 – Dr. Deaile explains why SAC had two legs of the nuclear triad. Missiles didn’t perform as well as bombs. Missiles were inaccurate and couldn’t always be fired when needed.

29:24 – He did research at Maxwell Air Force base and used many of the oral histories they have. He used the National Archives in Maryland to look at Air Force administrative records. He also interviewed General Dougherty who had been in charge of SAC. He also attended SAC reunions.

32:26 – Survival training at the Air Force Academy came from programs started by General LeMay for his pilots and crews. Auto hobby shops on Air Force bases came from General LeMay who loved working on cars. Aero clubs on bases also came from LeMay. LeMay also started gun clubs since he enjoyed shooting. He also instituted the dorm system on bases to replace Army style barracks.

37:42 – Dr. Deaile’s favorite part of the research was talking to old SAC members. They really respected General LeMay. They also loved all things Boeing.

40:11 – Dr. Deaile was surprised by how much in SAC came from what General LeMay learned in WWII.

44:17 – SAC was a command created to form a deterrent force. This book should be able to educate us how to create and hone a deterrent force.

49:55 – Dr. Deaile explains his record setting 44.3 hour bombing mission after 9/11.

54:14 – The book can be pre-ordered through Amazon or Naval Institute Press. You can order a signed copy through facebook or linkedin. He will also be teaching advanced nuclear deterrence studies.

 

For more “Military History Inside Out – Serious history for the critical thinker” please follow me on Facebook at warscholar, on twitter at Warscholar, on youtube at warscholar1945 and on Instagram @crisalvarezswarscholar

 

Guests: Dr. Mel Deaile

Host: Cris Alvarez